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Abstract Political units often spatially depend in their policy choices on other
units+ This also holds in dyadic settings where, as in much of international relations
research, analysis focuses on the interaction or relation between a pair or dyad of two
political units+ Yet, with few exceptions, social scientists have analyzed contagion in
monadic datasets only, consisting of individual political units+ This article catego-
rizes all possible forms of spatial effect modeling in both undirected and directed
dyadic data, where it is possible to distinguish the source and the target of interaction
~for example, exporter0importer, aggressor0victim, and so on!+ This approach enables
scholars to formulate and test novel mechanisms of contagion, thus ideally paving the
way for studies analyzing spatial dependence between dyads of political units+ To illus-
trate the modeling flexibility gained from an understanding of the full set of specifi-
cation options for spatial effects in dyadic data, we examine the diffusion of bilateral
investment treaties between developed and developing countries, building and extend-
ing on Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons’s 2006 study+ However, we come to different
conclusions about the channels through which bilateral investment treaties diffuse+
Rather than a capital-importing country being influenced by the total number of BITs
signed by other capital importers, as modeled in their original article, we find that a
capital-importing country is more likely to sign a BIT with a capital exporter only if
other competing capital importers have signed BITs with this very same capital
exporter+ Similarly, other capital exporters’ BITs with a specific capital importer influ-
ence an exporter’s incentive to agree on a BIT with the very same capital importer+
Policy choices of one political unit are often not independent of policies imple-
mented in other units, in which case they are said to depend spatially on each
other+ Recently, social scientists have become very interested in analyzing pro-
cesses of “policy contagion,” “policy diffusion,” and “policy spillover”
across jurisdictions+1 The vast majority of these studies have used a monadic data-
This article is based on equal authorship+ We thank Zach Elkins for providing the source data for the
weighting matrices used in this article and thank Steve Gibbons, Ian Gordon, Rob Franzese, and two
referees for many helpful comments+ Stata ado-files generating spatial effect variables for any of the
forms of contagion listed in Table 1 using basic link functions can be downloaded from ^http:00
personal+lse+ac+uk0neumayer& or ^http:00www+polsci+org0pluemper0&+ For ado-files that generate spa-
tial lags with more complex link functions, contact the authors+
1+ We use the terms contagion, diffusion, and spillover interchangeably even if they often represent
somewhat different modes of spatial dependence+
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set+2 In contrast, with few exceptions diffusion analysis remains nonexistent in
studies adopting a dyadic framework, that is, a setting where, as in much of inter-
national relations research, the unit of analysis is the pair or dyad of two politi-
cal units representing an interaction or a relation between the two units such as
the conclusion of a bilateral treaty or the initiation of violent conflict between
two countries+3 This is surprising because spatial dependence exists whenever the
marginal utility of one unit of analysis depends on the choices of other units of
analysis+ What one unit does in relation to other units, with which it forms a
dyad, will often influence and be influenced by the relations of other dyads, such
that spatial dependence is likely to exist in many dyadic settings+ For example,
the conclusion of bilateral treaties by some countries often affects the expected
payoffs of other countries from entering into similar treaties themselves+
One potential reason for the lack of studies analyzing spatial dependence in a
dyadic framework is that political scientists are not aware of the many specifica-
tion options for modeling such dependence in dyadic data+ Recognizing the vari-
ous ways in which spatial effects in dyadic data can be modeled will enable scholars
to formulate and test different and novel diffusion channels, thus facilitating and
hopefully spurring a whole new generation of studies analyzing spatial depen-
dence between dyads of political units at all levels of the political system—from
the global and international right down to the local+
This research note makes two contributions+ First, our analysis enriches the thriv-
ing literature applying dyadic data and calls on researchers to take spatial depen-
dence in such data seriously+ Spatial dependence often seems to be theoretically
warranted but is practically always ignored+ For example, the conclusion of bilat-
eral and multilateral trade, investment, alliance, and other agreements among some
dyads most likely influences the incentives for other dyads to conclude similar
agreements+ The conclusion of such agreements often generates externalities,
increases competition, induces cooperation, or leads to coercion, learning, emula-
tion, or other effects by which the policy choices of other dyads are affected+ Yet,
to our knowledge only three studies analyze spatial dependence in the diffusion of
bilateral investment treaties ~BITs!, preferential trade agreements, and bilateral alli-
ance formation, respectively+4 Another good example is the democratic peace lit-
erature+ King argues that “dyadic observations in international conflict data have
complex dependence structures+ + + + @I#n dyadic data, observation 1 may be U+S+-
Iraq; observation 2, U+S+-Iran; and observation 3, Iraq-Iran+ The dependence among
these separate observations is complicated, central to our theories and the inter-
2+ See, for example, Cho 2003; Murdoch and Sandler 2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Jahn 2006;
Franzese and Hays 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Swank 2006; and
Brooks 2007+
3+ The rare examples of studies analyzing spatial dependence in dyadic data include Porojan 2001;
Manger 2006; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006; and Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006+
4+ See Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Manger 2006; and Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006,
respectively+
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national system, critical for our methodological analyses, and ignored by most
previous researchers+”5 We agree with this judgment+ Spatial dependence in inter-
national conflict is typically ignored,6 leading to biased estimates of the observed
dyadic and unit-specific explanatory variables+ However, contrary to King we do
not believe that Bayesian hierarchical or random effects models provide the meth-
odologically optimal solution if researchers are indeed interested in spatial effects+
Rather, the spatial dependence should be modeled directly by the inclusion of spa-
tial effects in dyadic data analyses+ If theory suggests the existence of spatial depen-
dence, then modeling spatial patterns as nuisance—as in the “spatial error” model
or King’s hierarchical model—will be inferior to directly testing for spatial depen-
dence by fitting a spatial effect model, because none of the different possible “nui-
sance models” allows for a direct test of the spatial hypotheses derived from the
theory+7
Second, the few studies that actually do analyze spatial dependence in dyadic
data do so in a limited way, focusing solely on aggregate forms of contagion+ A
good example is Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons’s study of the diffusion of bilat-
eral investment treaties ~BITs!+8 The authors consider what we define further below
as aggregate target contagion from capital-importing countries only, where the deci-
sion of a capital importer to sign a BIT with a capital exporter depends on the
weighted sum of BITs signed by all other capital importers, regardless of the poten-
tial capital exporter with which these existing contracts have been signed+ Yet,
there is nothing in the theory of BIT diffusion that necessarily suggests such an
aggregate form of contagion being unconditional on the specific dyad under obser-
vation+ From a theoretical perspective, it seems at least as plausible to argue that a
capital importer’s BIT with a specific capital exporter depends on the BITs signed
by other capital importers with that very same capital exporter—but not with any
other capital exporting country+
This research note discusses all possible forms of channels through which pol-
icies may diffuse in dyadic data+ We start by briefly discussing spatial dependence
in monadic settings before categorizing the different and complex ways of mod-
eling spatial effects in dyadic data+ We will show that in undirected dyadic data,
dyads can spatially depend only on the policy choices of other dyads, which is
similar to the monadic setting in which units can depend only on the policy choices
of other units+ In directed dyadic data, there is more flexibility+ Here we have of
course the same possibility of dyad contagion as in undirected data+ However,
given that in directed data one can distinguish the source from the target of the
interaction, researchers can additionally model four more forms of contagion+ Two
of these model contagion as emanating from the aggregate policy choices of other
5+ King 2001, 498 ~emphasis in original!+
6+ We are not aware of any dyadic conflict study that models spatial dependence+
7+ Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006+
8+ Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006+
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sources and other targets, which leads to aggregate source contagion and aggre-
gate target contagion, respectively+ If, however, contagion does not come from
the aggregate policy choices of other sources or other targets, but only from their
policy choices with respect to a specific third party, then we get the two remaining
modeling options of specific source contagion and specific target contagion, respec-
tively+ In other words, the probability that source i interacts with target j increases
if ~but only if ! i already interacts with other targets m similar to j or if j already
interacts with other sources k similar to i +
Together, there are thus five forms of contagion for directed dyadic data, which
can be combined with various specifications of the weighting matrix+ The spatial
analysis of dyadic data therefore offers multiple options to researchers and makes
the choice of the correct model a difficult task—a task in which theory needs to
inform the specification of the spatial effects in the empirical model+9
In order to demonstrate the full potential of modeling spatial dependence in
dyadic data, we extend the analysis of Elkins and colleagues on the diffusion of
BITs by modeling and testing all possible forms of spatial lags+ To our knowl-
edge, their study was the first published article to include spatial lags in a directed
dyadic sample and it is also commendable for clearly specifying and justifying
their modeling approach+ Our analysis provides additional insights into the study
of BIT diffusion+ While we find that Elkins and colleagues were right in arguing
that competition among capital-importing target countries drives BIT spillovers,
our results suggest that a capital importer’s decision to sign a BIT with a capital
exporter depends only on similar importers’ BITs with the very same capital
exporter rather than on the similar importers’ total number of BITs with any cap-
ital exporter+ In other words, we find that dyad-specific target contagion matters
rather than aggregate target contagion+ In addition, we provide evidence that the
diffusion process also works through competition among capital-exporting source
countries: when other capital exporters have signed a BIT with a specific capital
importer, a capital exporting nation is more likely to also seek a BIT with the very
same capital importer+ Hence, here again, diffusion is driven by dyad-specific source
contagion+ Thus, we reproduce Elkins and colleagues’ finding that the agreement
of BITs between two countries spatially depends on the choices of other countries,
but we come to different conclusions with respect to the channels through which
BITs diffuse+
Spatial Dependence in Dyadic Data: A Categorization
Spatial effects between two jurisdictions occur whenever the marginal utility of
one unit depends on the policy choices of at least one other unit+10 There is no
9+ See also Plümper and Neumayer forthcoming+
10+ Franzese and Hays 2008, 3+
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shortage of theories predicting processes of policy diffusion and spillover across
units+11 All of these theories can also be applied to dyadic frameworks+ Moreover,
these theories are in principle compatible with all of the types of contagion we
will categorize in the sense that, depending on the context and the exact formula-
tion of these theories, each theory can require one or more of these types of
contagion+
Dyadic data allows the modeling of far more complex forms of spatial depen-
dence than monadic data+ To see why this is the case, we start with a brief expo-
sition of spatial effects in monadic data, then discuss spatial dependence in dyadic
data in more detail+
Spatial Dependence in Monadic Data
Besides spatial error models, which are rarely useful for political science research,12
two main ways of modeling spatial dependence exist+ By far the most popular
one, and the one we focus on in this study, is the spatial lag model, which regresses
the dependent variable on the spatially lagged dependent variable+ However, every-
thing we say equally applies to spatial-x models, which regress the dependent vari-
able on the weighted values of one or more independent explanatory variables
~other than the dependent variable!, and to spatial error models, which seek to
identify spatial dependence in the error term+
In its simplest purely cross-sectional form without control variables, spatial lag
models in a monadic dataset can be formulated as:
yi  r(
k
wik yk «i + ~1!
The spatial lag (k wik yk consists of two elements, namely what in the following
we refer to as the “spatial y” and the spatial weighting matrix wik+13 The spatial y
is the contemporaneous or temporally lagged value of the dependent variable in
all units k+ This is multiplied with an N{N block-diagonal spatial weighting matrix,
which measures the relative connectivity between N number of units i and N num-
ber of units k in the off-diagonal cells of the matrix ~the diagonal of the matrix has
values of zero because there i  k and units cannot spatially depend on them-
selves!+ The spatial autoregression parameter r gives the impact of the spatial lag
11+ Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; and Franzese and Hays 2008,
2, among others, distinguish between coercion ~that is, what Levi-Faur 2005 calls top-down approaches
to diffusion!, externalities ~Simmons and Elkins 2004; and Franzese and Hays 2006!, competition
~Hallerberg and Basinger 1998; and Basinger and Hallerberg 2004!, cooperation ~Genschel and Plümper
1997!, learning ~Mooney 2001; and Meseguer 2005!, and emulation ~Weyland 2005!+
12+ Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006+
13+ We would call yk the spatially lagged dependent variable, which we regard as the more appro-
priate term, if Anselin ~2003, 159! and others did not use this term for the entire spatial lag (k wik yk+
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on the dependent variable+ We will discuss the issue of specifying the weighting
matrix in more detail below+
Of course, in reality, researchers usually do not estimate the basic model dis-
played in equation ~1!, but they add control variables, use a cross-sectional time-
series dataset, control for temporal dynamics,14 control for common trends and
common shocks with period dummies, and sometimes account for unobserved spa-
tial heterogeneity ~or spatial clustering! with unit fixed effects+ To keep the expo-
sition simple, in what follows we will ignore everything that distracts from the
modeling of spatial dependence itself and therefore employ the most basic cross-
sectional setting, always keeping in mind that such a model can and should often
be extended to include a time dimension, dynamic modeling, control variables,
and so on+15
In monadic data, the specification of spatial lags gives researchers some flexi-
bility with respect to the variable that measures connectivity among units, but these
spatial lags leave researchers little choice on the specification of the weighting
matrix or on the specification of the spatial y+16 Dyadic data allows more flexible
and different specifications of both the weighting matrix and the spatial y+ Dyadic
data comes in two forms—undirected and directed—and we discuss the different
options for spatial lags available in both settings in turn after a brief introduction
to the differences between monadic and dyadic data+
Dyadic Data
Dyadic data consists of observations in which two individual units form a pair
~the dyad!+ There exist directed and undirected dyadic data+ In directed dyadic
data, the interaction between two dyad members ij initiates with i and is directed
toward j+ There is a source and a target, an origin and a destination, a sender and a
recipient, a giver and a taker, an aggressor and a victim, or some similar directed
relationship+ For example, in international trade one can distinguish between export-
ers and importers+ In foreign investment one can distinguish between home and
host countries+ In international migration or remittance flows, one can distinguish
sending and recipient countries+ In interstate violent conflict, there exist aggressor
and victim states, and so on+
In undirected dyadic data, it is either unclear from the data which of the two dyad
members initiated the interaction or this question is theoretically unimportant+ There-
14+ See Beck and Katz 1996; and Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005+
15+ We will similarly neglect all issues of estimation of spatial lag models, which is complicated by
the fact that with interdependent units of analysis, spatial dependence models typically suffer from
endogeneity ~see Anselin 1988; Ward and Gleditsch 2002; and Franzese and Hays 2006, 2007, and
2008!+ There are also important specification choices that researchers need to consider, which we dis-
cuss in a separate article ~Plümper and Neumayer forthcoming!+
16+ If the weighting variable used is directed, then researchers can specify wki instead of wik+ See
section on “Choice of Weighting Matrices” for more details+
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fore, while one can still distinguish i from j, one either cannot distinguish between
ij and ji or one does not want to make such a distinction+ Consequently, the vari-
able of interest is identical for dyads ij and ji and researchers typically keep only
one or the other in their dataset to avoid “double counting+”17 Theory can typically
determine the choice between undirected and directed dyadic data+ Take the con-
clusion of a contract as an example+ If the contract is voluntarily entered or if it is
of no further interest who was the initiator of the contract, then an undirected dyadic
dataset suffices+ If, however, researchers have an interest in who initiated the con-
tract or if contract agreement has not been reached voluntarily or if the contract
means different things to the two contract partners, then this could, and in fact
should, be analyzed with a directed dyadic dataset+
Bilateral investment treaties ~BITs! provide a good example of a case in which
contracts mean different things to the two contracting partners+ These treaties grant
foreign investors certain rights by limiting the policy autonomy of the govern-
ment of the country hosting the investment, whereas few, if any, costs are imposed
by the treaty on either the foreign investor or its home government+18 BITs are, at
least putatively, entered voluntarily, and it is not always clear who initiated the
treaty+19 Nevertheless, even though in principle BITs are symmetric in that both
governments face the same restrictions, in reality the vast majority of BITs have
been concluded between countries with radically different net foreign investment
positions+ For the predominantly capital-exporting country, the BIT mainly pro-
vides rights to its investors with few actual restrictions on its policy autonomy,
whereas the predominantly capital-importing country experiences the full restric-
tions on its policy autonomy ~which can still pay off due to the economic benefits
of increased inward FDI!+ Because of the asymmetry of the treaty’s effect, it makes
sense to analyze the conclusion of BITs in a country dyad dataset that is directed
from the capital-exporting to the capital-importing country, as Elkins and col-
leagues do+ The decision to treat a dyadic relationship as directed or undirected
thus requires theoretical justification+
Modeling Spatial Dependence in Undirected Dyads
The modeling of spatial dependence in undirected data strongly resembles that of
monadic data+ The only difference is that instead of contagion stemming from other
units, it comes from other dyads+ Hence, to model spatial dependence in undirected
dyadic data researchers make the dependent variable in a dyad between i and j a
function of the weighted sum of the dependent variable of all other dyads:
17+ Undirected dyadic data are commonly used in the international conflict literature ~see Russett,
Oneal, and Davis 1998; and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001!+
18+ See Guzman 1998; and Neumayer and Spess 2005+
19+ Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006 argue that capital-importing developing countries are the
major initiators of BITs, whereas Neumayer 2006 argues that BITs predominantly initiate from capital-
exporting developed countries+
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yij  r (
kmij
vpq ykm «ij , ~2a!
which due to the undirectedness of the dyadic dataset is equivalent to
yji  r (
mkji
vpq ymk «ji + ~2b!
We have denoted the connectivity or weighting matrix as vpq+ Later we will
discuss six different specifications of the weighting matrix, such that vpq  $wik,
wki ,wjm,wmj ,w~ij !~km!,w~km!~ij !% , but these are not exhaustive since combinations of
these links can also be theoretically warranted+ We leave a detailed explanation
and discussion of the weighting matrix until then+
Equations ~2a! and ~2b! are appropriate if, for example, one thinks that the deci-
sion of whether country i and country j enter into a voluntary treaty depends on
the weighted sum of existing treaties in all other dyads, where the weight is given
by vpq+ This form of contagion we call undirected dyad contagion+20 It is the mod-
eling strategy adopted in Manger’s analysis of the diffusion of preferential trade
agreements and in Gleditsch and Gartzke’s analysis of the effect of alliance ties
on international conflict+21
Modeling Spatial Dependence in Directed Dyads
Both monadic and undirected dyadic data offer only one option each for modeling
contagion+ In contrast, there are five options for modeling spatial dependence if
we analyze directed dyadic data+ The reason is that in directed dyads two actors i
and j have an asymmetric interaction and one can distinguish dyads ij, where unit
i is the source and unit j is the target, from dyads ji where these roles are reversed+
This means contagion can come from other dyads, as in undirected dyadic data,
but contagion can also come from other sources or from other targets+ Moreover,
where contagion stems from other sources or other targets, it can be their aggre-
gate policy choices that matter or their choices with respect to only the specific
dyad under consideration+
Starting with the option that directly resembles the modeling of spatial depen-
dence in undirected dyadic data, dyad ij can be modeled to be more likely to sign
a BIT if other dyads between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries
20+ Undirected dyad contagion can be further restricted such that all dyads containing either unit i
or unit j are excluded from having a contagious effect+ Such exclusive undirected dyad contagion would
be represented by yij  r(ki,mjvpq ykm  «ij +
21+ See Manger 2006; and Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006+
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have already agreed on such a treaty+ This form of spatial dependence we call
directed dyad contagion+22 Hence:
yij  r (
kmij
vpq ykm «ij + ~3!
Equation ~3! describes a situation in which the probability of two countries i
and j signing a BIT depends on the weighted sum of all other BITs existing between
capital-exporting countries k and capital-importing countries m+
In directed dyad contagion, the aggregate policy choices of other, similar dyads
matter+ In the remaining four forms of contagion in directed dyadic data, one can,
first, assume that the aggregate policy choices of other sources and other targets
matter+ In addition, one can also assume that only a subset of the sources ~targets!
influence the dyad under observation, namely those sources ~targets!, which are
linked to the target ~source! of the dyad under observation+ If the policy choice of
the directed dyad ij spatially depends on the aggregate actions of other sources k
~ i !, that is on their relationship with all other targets m, not just the specific
target j, then we get what we name aggregate source contagion:
yij  r(
ki
(
m
vpq ykm «ij ~4!
Alternatively, one can make the policy choice of dyad ij depend on the aggre-
gate actions of other targets m, that is, on their policy choices with all other sources
k, not just the specific source i + This leads to aggregate target contagion:
yij  r(
k
(
mj
vpq ykm «ij ~5!
Equation ~5! is appropriate if the BIT decision of dyad ij spatially depends on
the aggregate or total number of BITs that other capital importers m ~ j ! have
concluded with any capital-exporting country k+
Additionally, instead of policy choices depending on the aggregate choices of
other sources or targets, they may well depend on the choices of other sources or
targets in relation to the specific dyad under consideration+ With
yij  r(
ki
vpq ykj «ij ~6!
22+ As in the undirected case, directed dyad contagion can similarly be further restricted such that
all dyads containing either source i or target j are excluded from having a contagious effect+ Such
exclusive directed dyad contagion would be represented by yij  r (
k°i,mj
vpq ykm «ij +
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the probability of, say, two countries i and j signing a BIT depends on the weighted
sum of BITs signed by other capital-exporting countries k with the very same
capital-importing country j+ This we name specific source contagion+ In compari-
son to the aggregate source contagion represented by equation ~4!, equation ~6!
describes a situation in which other sources k affect i ’s interaction with j only if
countries k have signed a BIT with the very same target country j+ In other words,
Canada’s interest in signing BITs with capital importers remains largely unaffected
by the total number of BITs the United States, Germany, France, and others have
signed+ However, if the United States, Germany, France, and others sign a BIT
with—say Chile—the incentive for Canada to also sign a BIT with Chile increases+
Lastly, in equation ~7! country j’s incentive to sign a BIT with country i depends
on the weighted sum of BITs signed by other capital importing countries m with
the very same capital-exporting country i:
yij  r (
mj
vpq yim «ij , ~7!
This type of spatial dependence we call specific target contagion+ Compared to
the aggregate target contagion described by equation ~5!, equation ~7! describes a
situation in which other targets m affect j ’s interaction with i only if countries m
have signed a BIT with the very same source country i + In other words, Chile’s
interest in signing BITs with capital exporters remains largely unaffected by the
total number of BITs Argentina and Brazil have signed+ However, if Argentina
and Brazil sign a BIT with—say the United States—the incentive for Chile to also
sign a BIT with the United States increases+
The Choice of Weighting Matrices
The specification of spatial effects requires two choices+ First, the researcher needs
to specify the spatial y, as discussed above+ Second, one also needs to specify the
type of weighting matrix used to model the connectivity between units or dyads
that form the spatial dependence+23
In monadic data analysis, the weighting matrix provides a link between unit i
and units k+ For each observation yi , the corresponding element of the spatial lag
gives a weighted sum of the yk observations, with weights always given by the
relative connectivity between i and k+ Hence, the spatial effect is a weighted func-
tion of the dependent variable in all other units k+ The connectivity can be directed
as with, say, exports+ This leads to two possible link functions, namely, vpq wik,
which would measure exports from i to k; and vpq  wki , which would measure
23+ We do not discuss the issue of row-standardization here+ It is an important issue ~see Plümper
and Neumayer forthcoming!—but equally important for monadic and dyadic data+
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exports from k to i + If the connectivity is undirected as with, for example, conti-
guity or geographical distance, then there is only one link function since wik wki +
Compared to monadic data, the choice of weighting matrix becomes more com-
plicated in dyadic data+ Starting with undirected dyadic data, we distinguish basic
from more complex link functions+As for the basic ones, the effect of the spatial y
may be weighted by a link function measuring connectivity between either unit i
or unit j on the one hand and other units, called k~ i ! or m~ j !, on the other
hand+ Formally, the weighting matrix vpq can thus take the following four differ-
ent forms: vpq wik, vpq wki , vpq wjm, or vpq wmj + Note that there are four
~rather than two! basic link functions because even if the spatial y is undirected,
the variable of connectivity can of course be directed+ If connectivity is undirected,
however, then there are only two basic link functions: vpq  wik  wki and vpq
 wjm wmj + More complex functions link dyads rather than units with each other+
These will be discussed shortly for directed data+ Finally, one can create further
link functions by combining any of these link functions with each other in any
way+
In directed dyadic data, it is useful again to distinguish basic link functions, that
is, those that link either sources or targets with each other, from more complex link
functions that link dyads with each other+ As for basic link functions, in aggregate
and specific source contagion the link function can represent connectivity between
the source unit i and other source units k ~vpq  wik or vpq  wki !+24 Whereas in
aggregate and specific target contagion it can measure connectivity between the tar-
get unit j and other target units m ~vpqwjm or vpqwmj !+25 In directed dyad con-
tagion, any of the four basic link functions just presented can be used+
Link functions that represent connectivity between dyads are more complex and
are bound to be employed far less commonly than the more basic link functions+26
For aggregate and specific source contagion, the link function can represent con-
nectivity between the dyad ij and dyads kj, that is, connectivity between the dyad
consisting of source unit i and target unit j on the one hand and dyads made up of
other source units k and the same target unit j on the other hand+ This leads to
either vpq w~ij !~kj ! or vpq w~kj !~ij !+ For aggregate and specific target contagion,
the link function can measure connectivity between the dyad ij and dyads im, that
is, connectivity between the dyad consisting of source unit i and target unit j on
the one hand and dyads comprised of the same source unit i and other target units
24+ Strictly speaking, other link functions are possible ~for example, the weighting matrix could
measure connectivity between i and m!, but these two are the most plausible ones+ A similar point
applies, mutatis mutandis, to the weighting matrices listed for aggregate and specific target contagion+
25+ As before, these collapse to one each if connectivity is undirected+
26+ The reason is that in order to create these complex link functions one needs a dataset that links
dyads with dyads, that is, a so-called 4-adic dataset with dimension ~Ni{Nj!~Ni{Nj!T, where Ni is the
number of sources, Nj the number of targets and T the number of time periods+ For many applications,
this would lead to a dataset too big to be handled by a personal computer+ In contrast, the Stata ado-
files provided by the authors can create spatial lags employing the more basic link functions from a
simple dyadic dataset of dimension ~Ni{Nj! T as they parse through a virtual 4-adic dataset+
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TABLE 1. Spatial lag specification in monadic and dyadic data
Type of contagion (Partial) model Basic link functions More complex link functions
Monadic data
Unit contagion yi r (
k
vpq yk {{{ «i vpq wikwki
Undirected dyads
Undirected dyad contagion
yij r (
kmij
vpq ykm «ij
m
yji r (
mkji
vpq ymk «ji
vpq wikwkiwjm
wmj
vpq 
w~ij !~km!
w~km!~ij !
any of the functions for directed data
or function of any combination thereof
Directed dyads
Directed dyad contagion yij r (
kmij
vpq ykm «ij vpq wikwkiwjm
wmj
vpq 
w~ij !~km!
w~km!~ij !
any of the functions for directed data
or function of any combination thereof
Aggregate source contagion yij r (
ki
(
m
vpq ykm «ij vpq wikwki vpq w~ij !~kj !w~kj !~ij !
Aggregate target contagion yij r (
k
(
mj
vpq ykm «ij vpq wjmwmj vpq w~ij !~im!w~im!~ij !
Specific source contagion yij r (
ki
vpq ykj «ij vpq wikwki vpq w~ij !~kj !w~kj !~ij !
Specific target contagion yij r (
mj
vpg yim «ij vpq wjmwmj vpq w~ij !~im!w~im!~ij !
m on the other hand, which would lead to either vpq  w~ij !~im! or vpq  w~im!~ij !+
For both undirected and directed dyad contagion, any of these complex link func-
tions can be employed+27 Additionally, the link function can measure connectivity
between dyad ij and dyads km, that is, either vpq  w~ij !~km! or vpq  w~km!~ij !+
As with undirected data, further link functions can be created by combining in
any way any of the basic or complex link functions with each other+ The two sim-
plest ways of combining connectivities are linear addition and multiplication+ Other
functional forms may be theoretically warranted in certain cases+
Summary
We have categorized all possible forms of spatial dependence along the distinc-
tion between monadic data, undirected dyadic data, and directed dyadic data+ Table 1
summarizes all the available specification options for spatial lags+
Clearly, not only does the proper specification of the spatial y become more
flexible when researchers move from monadic to undirected dyadic data and from
there to directed dyadic data28—researchers also gain degrees of freedom in the
specification of the weighting matrices+ The increased flexibility means that the
analysis of spatial effects in dyadic data sets requires much more theoretical rea-
soning than in monadic data+ Researchers need to consider what type of contagion
their theoretical model demands and also justify the specification of the weighting
matrix+
Application: Spatial Dependence in a Directed
Country Dyad Sample of BIT Diffusion
In order to demonstrate how the different forms of spatial dependence can lead to
different insights on the process of policy diffusion, we build on and extend Elkins
and colleagues’ analysis of the diffusion of BITs over the period 1970 to 2000
using a Cox proportional hazard model+29 They argue that competition among poten-
tial host countries, typically developing countries, for FDI causes the diffusion of
BITs+30 We restrict our analysis to dyads in which source countries i are Western
developed countries and countries j ~targets! are developing countries, giving us a
27+ For undirected dyad contagion, simply read this paragraph with the words “source” and “target”
deleted+ For example, vpq  w~ij !~kj ! links dyad ij to dyads kj, that is, link the dyad of unit i with j to
dyads consisting of units other than i with unit j+
28+ In addition, one can of course combine all the possible spatial lags of directed dyadic data into
one estimating equation+
29+ Their analysis covers the period 1960 to 2000, but data for the 1960s often seem to be extrap-
olated backward, which we do not follow+
30+ In their directed dyadic country sample, the richer country of a dyad is always the origin coun-
try i and the poorer country is the destination country j and dyads between high-income countries are
excluded+
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directed dyad sample of dimension Ni{Nj{T in which sources never become tar-
gets and vice versa+31
Elkins and colleagues propose three different measures of competition for the
weighting matrix: export-market, export-product, and infrastructure competition+
For our application we use export-product competition, which we regard as theo-
retically most plausible+32 The weighting matrix thus measures the extent to which
countries export a similar basket of goods+33
Elkins and colleagues analyze a variant of aggregate target contagion by esti-
mating a variant of equation ~5!, namely
yijt  r(
k
(
mj
wjmt1 ykmt1*  «ijt + ~8!
where y * is the sum total of BITs in force in each host country in year t1+34 Note
that by using y * rather than y in the spatial dependence variable, this is not strictly
speaking a spatial lag model+ Spatial dependence derives from the sum total of exist-
ing BITs in other developing countries m in year t1, with connectivity repre-
sented by a row-standardized matrix that measures connectivity between j and m,
that is, by export-product competition among developing countries+ In other words,
a developing country j is more likely to sign a BIT with a developed country i at
time t if other developing countries m with a similar basket of export-products have
a larger sum total of BITs in place with developed countries k in the period t1+
To this, we add all the other possible forms of spatial dependence, which are all
consistent with common micro-foundations seeking to explain the spread of BITs+
We do so in order to show what happens to the results of Elkins and colleagues,
but also because these other forms can be theoretically justified+ To start, we will
analyze aggregate source contagion by estimating a variant of equation ~4!, namely
yijt  r(
ki
(
m
wikt1 ykmt1*  «ijt + ~9!
The only difference to Elkins and colleagues is that competition among devel-
oped countries causes the spread of BITs rather than competition among develop-
31+ Western developed countries are defined as Canada, the United States, Western European coun-
tries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand+ These countries typically do not conclude BITs with each
other and FDI flows almost exclusively from developed to developing countries over the period to
2000+
32+ Results are similar for using one of the other two weighting matrices ~results available on request!+
33+ Measured on a scale from 1 to 1 ~from total dissimilarity to total similarity!+ Like Elkins,
Guzman, and Simmons ~2006!, to make it strictly nonnegative we add 1 to this measure so it runs
from 0 to 2+
34+ Control variables are suppressed from the formal exposition for simplicity+
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ing countries+ This specification can be motivated if one follows the argument that
developed countries are usually the driving force behind the conclusion of BITs+35
Both forms of spatial dependence so far assumed that the aggregate behavior of
competing developing or developed countries matters for other dyads’ decisions
to conclude BITs+ However, it may well be that countries look more specifically at
the question with whom their competitors have signed a BIT, not just how many
BITs have been signed by competitors no matter with whom+ With
yijt  r (
mj
wjmt1 yimt1 «ijt , ~10!
a developing country j more likely accepts a BIT with a developed country i if
other export-product competing developing countries m have previously con-
cluded a BIT with the same developed country i ~specific target contagion!+
Whereas with
yijt  r(
ki
wikt1 ykjt1 «ijt , ~11!
a developed country i more likely concludes a BIT with developing country j if
other export-product competing developed countries k have previously concluded
a BIT with that same developing country m ~specific source contagion!+
Finally, it is conceivable as well that both countries of a dyadic pair ij are influ-
enced by the behavior of other competing developed and other competing devel-
oping countries with respect to each other+ This leads us to model directed dyad
contagion in the form of
yijt  r (
kmij
wikt1 wjmt1 ykmt1 «ijt , ~12!
where country i is more likely to sign a BIT with country j if other developed
countries k with whom country i competes have previously signed a BIT with
other developing countries m with whom country j competes+36
Table 2 presents the estimation results+ We include most of the control variables
of Elkins and colleagues37 using the same sources of data, leaving out variables
with poor data availability, variables that had no effect in their analysis as well as
35+ Neumayer 2006+
36+ We have chosen a multiplicative functional form connecting the weighting matrix of export-
product competition among developed countries ~wik! with that of developing countries ~wjm!+ By doing
so we implicitly assume that both competitions are simultaneously important for the spatial lag+ A
linear additive form would have assumed that competition among, say, developing countries can sub-
stitute for the lack of competition among developed countries+ The results in Table 2 are hardly affected
if one chooses this alternative functional form+
37+ Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006+
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TABLE 2. Spatial dependence in the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties
Model 1
Aggregate
target
contagion
Model 2
Aggregate
source
contagion
Model 3
Specific
target
contagion
Model 4
Specific
source
contagion
Model 5
Directed
dyad
contagion
Model 6
Multiple
forms of
contagion
Model 7
Multiple
forms of
contagion
Model 8
Specific
forms of
contagion
(
k
(
mj
wjmt1 ykmt1* 0+011 0+005
~3+77!*** ~1+24!
(
ki
(
m
wikt1 ykmt1* 0+004 0+001
~1+44! ~0+33!
(
mj
wjmt1 yimt1 0+060 0+061 0+062 0+062
~18+92!*** ~18+72!*** ~19+12!*** ~19+24!***
(
ki
wikt1 ykjt1 0+032 0+033 0+033 0+033
~13+55!*** ~13+84!*** ~13+89!*** ~13+87!***
(
kmij
wikt1 wjmt1 ykmt1 0+005 0+004 0+000
~1+31! ~0+96! ~0+09!
extractive industries/exports (host) 0+002 0+002 0+003 0+002 0+002 0+002 0+002 0+002
~1+18! ~1+24! ~1+63! ~0+94! ~1+23! ~1+31! ~1+32! ~1+32!
common law (host) 0+336 0+349 0+398 0+257 0+352 0+306 0+310 0+310
~3+13!*** ~3+25!*** ~3+70!*** ~2+37!** ~3+26!*** ~2+82!*** ~2+85!*** ~2+85!***
imf credit dummy (host) 0+413 0+426 0+375 0+197 0+429 0+132 0+137 0+135
~3+63!*** ~3+76!*** ~3+32!*** ~1+72!* ~3+79!*** ~1+15! ~1+19! ~1+17!
ln gdp (host) 0+224 0+227 0+195 0+132 0+224 0+094 0+093 0+093
~4+34!*** ~4+44!*** ~3+80!*** ~2+49!** ~4+37!*** ~1+75!* ~1+74!* ~1+73!*
per capita income (host) 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000
~1+21! ~1+02! ~0+87! ~1+28! ~0+93! ~1+20! ~1+09! ~1+12!
gdp growth (host) 0+045 0+043 0+043 0+020 0+043 0+021 0+020 0+021
~4+43!*** ~4+28!*** ~4+28!*** ~1+98!** ~4+27!*** ~2+01!** ~2+00!** ~2+02!**
fdi inflow (host) 0+019 0+026 0+026 0+030 0+027 0+027 0+029 0+028
~1+20! ~1+66!* ~1+72!* ~1+97!** ~1+75!* ~1+73!* ~1+84!* ~1+79!*
capital account (% of gdp) (host) 1+259 1+229 1+006 0+825 1+217 0+635 0+612 0+620
~2+28!** ~2+24!** ~1+83!* ~1+56! ~2+23!** ~1+18! ~1+14! ~1+16!
level of democracy (host) 0+011 0+010 0+006 0+007 0+009 0+006 0+005 0+005
~1+39! ~1+28! ~0+81! ~0+95! ~1+17! ~0+78! ~0+65! ~0+68!
diplomatic representation (host) 0+008 0+007 0+010 0+007 0+007 0+012 0+011 0+011
~2+75!*** ~2+40!** ~3+52!*** ~2+40!** ~2+34!** ~3+76!*** ~3+59!*** ~3+71!***
bilateral trade to gdp of host 3+288 3+071 2+518 3+028 2+978 2+227 2+138 2+180
~2+16!** ~1+99!** ~1+48! ~1+95!* ~1+93!* ~1+28! ~1+23! ~1+26!
colonial ties 1+055 1+057 0+562 1+069 1+054 0+620 0+618 0+617
~4+43!*** ~4+42!*** ~2+29!** ~4+49!*** ~4+41!*** ~2+54!** ~2+53!** ~2+52!**
common language 0+113 0+109 0+017 0+088 0+098 0+068 0+067 0+067
~0+60! ~0+58! ~0+09! ~0+47! ~0+52! ~0+36! ~0+35! ~0+35!
AIC _ BIC 7299 6 7419 7311 6 7431 7018 6 7138 7154 6 7274 7312 6 7432 6854 6 6999 6855 6 7001 6852 6 6980
ll 3635+5 3641+7 3494+9 3563+0 3641+9 3405+0 3410+7 3410+8
Notes: BITs  555+ Dyads  2411+ N  38395+ Z-statistics in brackets+ *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level+
variables that do not vary across dyads ~the flexible baseline hazard captures their
effect!+ To be consistent with their analysis we do not instrument for the spatial
lags or apply spatial maximum likelihood even though this may be warranted given
serial correlation in the data, in which case the use of spatial lags temporally lagged
by one time period cannot fully solve the endogeneity problem+ Importantly, we
normalize the spatial effect variables to fall into the interval from 0 to 100 by
dividing each lag by its maximum and multiplying by 100+ We do this because
before normalization the spatial effect variables are in different units, given that
we follow Elkins and colleagues’ use of y *, the sum total of BITs in force, rather
than y for aggregate target and source contagion+ Normalization allows us to directly
compare the relative importance of all the spatial effect variables with each other
without needing to compute conditional effects+
Models 1 to 5 in Table 2 estimate the effect of each spatial lag separately+ In
column ~1!, the spatial lag models aggregate target contagion+ The lag coefficient
is positive and statistically significant, corroborating the finding of Elkins and col-
leagues that the aggregate past behavior of other developing countries with simi-
lar export-product structures matters for the conclusion of a BIT between a
developed and a developing country+ In column ~2!, the spatial lag models source
contagion instead+ The lag coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting that
the aggregate past behavior of other export-competing developed countries does
not matter for the agreement on BITs+
In column ~3!, we move away from aggregate behavior and the spatial lag mod-
els specific target contagion+ The lag coefficient is positive and highly significant,
suggesting that a developing country is more likely to sign a BIT with a specific
developed country if other developing countries with similar export-product struc-
tures have an existing BIT with the same developed country+ Column ~4! reports a
model of specific source contagion+ The coefficient of this spatial lag is again pos-
itive and statistically significant+ This result qualifies the finding of column ~2!+
The aggregate BIT behavior of other competing developed countries as such does
not matter, but if other competing developed countries have signed a BIT with a
specific developing country, then this makes it more likely that a developed coun-
try will also sign a BIT with this specific developing country j+ In column ~5!, we
test directed dyad contagion, which does not have an effect statistically different
from zero+ Accordingly, we find no evidence that a developing country is more
likely to sign a BIT with a developed country if other developing countries with
an export-product structure similar to the developing country have previously signed
BITs with other developed countries that have an export-product structure similar
to the developed country+
So far, we have included the spatial lag variables separately+ However, these
spatial lags could be correlated with each other+ A harder test of the various diffu-
sion channels thus requires their joint inclusion in one model+ Unfortunately, the
aggregate source and target contagion spatial lags are so highly correlated with
each other that their simultaneous inclusion leads to severe multicollinearity prob-
lems, whereas the correlations among the other spatial lag variables remain mod-
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erate+ We therefore present two sets of regressions, one including all spatial lags
but the aggregate source contagion one—column ~6!—and the other including all
spatial lags but the aggregate target contagion one—column ~7!+ Strikingly, with
the dyadic contagion spatial lags included, aggregate target contagion no longer
matters+ Instead, we find evidence that the diffusion of BITs works exclusively
through specific source and target contagion+ Column ~8! reports the results from
a model which includes only these two significant forms of contagion+
One can also compare the goodness of fit of the estimated models with each
other+ Note that each of Models 1 to 5, which estimate separate and isolated forms
of contagion, are nested in either Model 6 or 7+ Both the Akaike Information Cri-
terion ~AIC! and the Bayesian Information Criterion ~BIC! suggest that Models 6
and 7 fit the data better than the restricted Models 1 to 5+ This suggests that the
models with multiple forms of contagion perform better than all models with indi-
vidual forms of contagion+ However, Model 8, which includes only specific source
and target contagion has the lowest AIC and BIC of all the models+ Since Model 8
is itself nested in both Models 6 and 7, this suggests that aggregate source and
target contagion do not improve the model fit relative to a model that contains
only dyad-specific forms of source and target contagion+ From this perspective,
Model 8 is clearly superior to all other models+
The normalization of spatial lag variables allows us to assess their relative sub-
stantive importance+ We find that the effect of the specific target contagion spatial
lag is about twice as large as the effect of the specific source contagion lag, sug-
gesting the former is the substantively more important diffusion channel+ In con-
clusion, we find that Elkins and colleagues were right in arguing that competition
among developing countries exerts an important influence on the diffusion of BITs+
However, policies do not diffuse via competition among capital importers at the
aggregate level, but via their competition at the dyad-specific level+ In addition,
Elkins and colleagues neglected competition among developed countries for sign-
ing BITs with specific developing countries, which also has a statistically signifi-
cant, but substantively less important effect compared to competition among
developing countries+
Our findings are consistent with several theories of policy diffusion+ It seems,
however, that theories of policy learning and bargaining theories of policy conces-
sions explain the specific forms of BIT diffusion better than theories of economic
competition+ If theories of competition were valid, one should find evidence for
the aggregate form of diffusion that Elkins and colleagues have modeled+ If other
competing capital importers and exporters agree on BITs, then this should affect
the allocation of investment flows across countries since BITs reduce the risk of
foreign investment, thereby inducing a capital importer or exporter to react by
similarly seeking to conclude more BITs+ Yet, the superiority of specific forms of
contagion in our empirical analysis suggests that other governments learn from a
BIT that the two signatory countries are indeed willing to sign BITs with other
partners as well+ A capital importer that accepts a BIT with one capital-exporting
country is less likely to resist another capital exporter’s suggestion to also agree
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on a BIT+ The same applies for a capital exporter: having signed a BIT with one
capital importer signals willingness to conclude a BIT with another capital importer
as well+ In addition, our results inform the debate over whether BITs mainly serve
as a commitment or signaling device+38 If capital importers sign BITs to signal to
any potential investor an investment-friendly domestic climate, then aggregate tar-
get contagion should matter: if one’s competitors have concluded more BITs then
one needs to conclude more BITs to send a firm signal to potential investors+ That
aggregate target contagion does not seem to matter suggests that BITs mainly serve
as a commitment device to protect investment from the specific capital exporter
with whom a BIT has been concluded+
Conclusion
Spatial analyses can be fruitfully extended to dyadic relations between countries
or other political units+ In particular, we have shown that the menu of choice
increases by moving from monadic to undirected dyadic data and increases fur-
ther still when analyzing directed dyadic data+ We have illustrated the modeling
possibilities in directed dyadic data by extending Elkins and colleagues’ analysis
of the diffusion of BITs+ Elkins and colleagues correctly argued that competition
among capital importers determines the spread of BITs, but we conclude that the
diffusion of BITs is more specific, with a capital importer’s decision to sign a BIT
with a capital exporter depending only on whether other competing capital import-
ers have signed a BIT with this very same capital exporter and not just with any
capital exporter+ In addition, we found evidence for similar dyad-specific source
contagion working via competition among capital exporters+
In our application, all types of contagion have theoretical plausibility and were
therefore tested+ In general, however, researchers should not mine the data for poten-
tial evidence of all types of contagion but test only those types of contagion spec-
ified by their theory+ Aggregate source and0or target contagion will often be a
plausible diffusion channel, but the specific channels can be equally, if not more
appropriate+ To give but three examples+ In the bipolar world of the Cold War
period one might theorize that alliances diffused primarily via directed dyad con-
tagion: if the Soviet Union allied with, say, India this increased the likelihood that
the United States would ally with neighboring Pakistan+ With economic sanctions,
one might consider specific source contagion as most appropriate: as some states
impose sanctions on a specific target, the likelihood increases that other states will
follow suit+ With preferential bilateral trade agreements between developed and
developing countries, one might theorize that diffusion works mainly via specific
target and specific source contagion+ If, say, Chile has managed to conclude such
38+ See Neumayer and Spess 2005+
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an agreement with the United States, other developing countries such as Peru,
Colombia, and Panama will want to conclude a similar treaty with the United States,
while other developed countries such as Canada, the European Union, and Japan
seek a similar treaty with Chile+ A better understanding of the full set of options
of specifying spatial effects in dyadic data will allow formulating and testing novel
hypotheses predicting dependence of a dyad of two political units on the policy
choices of other sources, other targets, or other dyads+
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